July 09, 2008

Flip Flop and You Don't Stop

Thru John I see McCain is taking heat: first he said we'd have to leave if a sovereign Iraqi government instructed requested us to, and now his advisor's telling us that

Senator McCain has always said that conditions on the ground — including the security threats posed by extremists and terrorists, and the ability of Iraqi forces to meet those threats — would be key determinants in U.S. force levels.

When it comes to defending John McCain, I admit to a certain enthusiasm gap. But here's something that seems pretty straightforward to me: the US knows that Iraq can order us out, and Iraq knows we have a lot of bargaining power when it comes to leaving certain token but significant forces behind. So McCain is right to admit that Iraq can send most US troops packing -- and should, should its government so decide -- but that the US has the interest and the leverage to negotiate a residual presence that costs a lot less in blood and treasure.

This strikes me as about the best of both worlds. When you boil it down, the problem with occupying Iraq has nothing to do with 'empire' and everything to do with the costs of 'empire.' You drive those costs down -- and the numbers in personnel that drive them -- and you drive down 'empire'. I'm cool with this, and I think I'm on the side of the vast majority of Americans of both parties on that.

MORE...In other words, what the WSJ Editors said...if what they mean by a 'significant' presence is what I think of as an insignificant one. Somehow I suspect they mean something pretty different. But, again, 30,000 troops, for example, is significantly lower than our current deployment, and Americans deal in round numbers. The American people and the Editors may wind up agreeing on what I still consider too heavy and costly a footprint. Another possibility: everyone winds up agreeing the size and cost of the future footprint are amiably low. Key takeaway: such a sunny ending (no pun) will be the consequence of America's best and classic assets -- luck and pluck -- not the visionary genius of any of our Supreme Leaders.

June 25, 2008

Hypocrisy as Success in Iraq

Matt:

And it's true -- the security gains of the past year do make the Bush/McCain strategy of perpetual military entanglement in Iraq look a lot more viable than it looked a year ago. But it's also true that the security gains of the past year make a strategy of leaving Iraq look a lot more viable than it looked a year ago.

So the obvious answer is do both: draw down our forces at our pleasure, gradually leaving a reasonably inexpensive remainder in place which everyone will eventually forget about. This hardly sounds like imperialism to me. It sounds like my longstanding strategy of ninja-like withdrawal, swift, silent stages of withdrawal at times and places of our choosing. The problem of course is that for the pro-'entanglement' people, military entanglement (large numbers, heavy footprint) is just a means to, or a prop for, political entanglement. That sounds a lot more like empire. And anti-'entanglement' people want to pull up military stakes primarily because they want to pull political stakes. Leaving a relatively cheap 30 or 40,000 troops behind is unacceptable for them insofar as also left behind is the world's largest embassy and a whole network of client-patron relationships managed from Washington and designed to keep Iraqi sovereignty contingent upon US desires and profits (or those of its ruling cliques). Be that as it may, I find it key to emphasize how there need not be any connection between a residual military presence and a massive political (or, um, economic) presence. Nor does this have to be a naive approach, although it can be. The question then would shift to why a residual military presence is worth the extra work of ensuring that it doesn't come along with quasi-imperial political and economic entanglement/exploitation. But I'm still of the mind that some types of political and economic influence are pretty benign, boring, and useful, whereas others are really bad, exhausting, and more trouble than they're worth. And I bet that either a McCain or an Obama occupation -- which we'll see for at least a little while, and probably a longer while -- will strengthen my suspicion that the US is headed toward the benign/boring/useful side of things.

But see Noah.

May 21, 2008

Heroes/Martyrs

When he's not topping the AmScene charts, Reihan's resurrecting my long-lost favorite meme about stupidly staying in Iraq out of a 'sense of honor':
when they say we need to stay in Iraq and kill militia members or insurgents to honor the sacrifice of the Americans who’ve died — advocates of withdrawal are right to say that this argument is senseless, though it has an emotional appeal to many who’ve lost comrades. If the U.S. should keep actively supporting the Iraqi government, as I think it should, it should do so because it is the best way to advance U.S. national security objectives and to meet our collective security obligations. And there’s no sense in pretending that there is an obvious answer to this question that will be pellucidly clear to all right-thinking people.

March 20, 2008

This Is the Song that Never Ends

Matt Yglesias notices the Weekly Standard piece insisting that McCain must continue to justify going to war in Iraq in the first place, penned by Peter Feaver, a Duke professor and civil-mil relations expert called up by the Administration when he first noted that people support wars when framed in terms of seeking victory. (Full disclosure: he also oversaw my undergrad thesis.)

It is striking how smart people who talk about Iraq all seem convinced that sustaining the argument over starting the war is worthwhile or even necessary. One even feels like those who want to 'get beyond' all that want to do so because they think like it's an argument they can never really win. But what do the American People want? Not an ongoing rehash and recriminations fest. They want, in my estimation, to stop pouring trillions into the sand. Period. Whether that means staying or leaving or to what degree. The trick is that they will certainly tolerate pouring mere millions or even several billions into Iraq for an indefinite period of time. They are wise on this count.

But elections are really not won or lost on horse sense and citizens' hunches. They are won, at least nowadays, on the matched mobilization of messages on the air and voters on the ground. In the current economic climate, the war simply looks too expensive. And the price tag will not drop anytime soon. So the argument has to be on the merits. And arguing on the merits means justifying the invasion. It is a great irritation to discover that after five years of mindbogglingly high spending, we are facing the logic of an austerity war, but there it is. In 2005 I was running around saying that America's great power is the ability to waste three years of budgets that no other country can afford -- but that America is doomed if it does this for six years. Well, here we are at Year Five. And all the justification in the world can't sustain an invasion for which we no longer have the money. Not that anyone really thinks otherwise, but for now, this is the song that never ends.

March 19, 2008

5 Years, 5 Lessons

Rod has a good post up on Iraq 5 years in. His 'lessons learned' are a bit different than mine:

+ The human capacity for self-deception is boundless. Beware emotion in political reasoning.
+ Do not trust the government. Its leaders will lie, both to you and to themselves.
+ Culture precedes politics.
+ Liberal democracy is not universally the best way to govern societies, especially Islamic ones.
+ Having a strong military is no guarantee that you'll be a strong nation. America is much weaker than we think.
+ You cannot trust the Republican Party on foreign policy and national security. That's not to say you can trust the Democrats either.
+ It is easy to look at a leader who is blindly, foolishly arrogant, and think you're looking at confidence. It is easy to think yourself confident, but in fact be blindly, foolishly arrogant.
+ History matters. The temptation to think it doesn't is constant -- particularly among Americans, who are so ignorant of it, and who think we can defy its lessons.

Keeping it (for now) to five lessons, I'd suggest the following:

+ The Security Council cannot be trusted to enforce its own Resolutions.
+ Order remains the first need of all.
+ Do not expect to afford something like this for another generation.
+ Luck and fortune have been wildly on our side.
+ Bipartisanship masks incompetence.

December 14, 2007

Mission Accomplished

We have so totally won in Iraq.

November 28, 2007

The Logic of 1441

In yesterday's post on 'overreach' as an idea that emerges from failure (Pickett's Charge is another example), I tried to suggest that the invasion of Iraq probably would not have even been conceivable as overreach if it had happened without the massive contradictory breakdown of Western foreign policy that took place between the unanimous passage of 1441 and the Azores conference. Happily Matt Yglesias has put the point expertly with a little help from Bubba, who penned an op-ed on March 18, 2003 that we should all go back and read:

I wish that Russia and France had supported Blair's resolution. Then, Hans Blix and his inspectors would have been given more time and supprt for their work. But that's not where we are. Blair is in a position not of his own making, because Iraq and other nations were unwilling to follow the logic of 1441.

Clinton should have written "because France and Russia were unwilling to follow the logic of 1441, and although Russia has never shared America's basic interests, for France to do this is not just irritating but inconsistent with its very being as a Western democracy devoted to the rule of international law." But even as written it seems to me that this paragraph is unquestionably accurate. Nonetheless, once a Global Force for the Implementation of International Law proved itself to be something nobody really wanted, the possibility of overreach came into being. So Yglesias can cry out as follows:

What Blair believed was right was, of course, invading Iraq. Obviously, it's possible that Clinton wrote a March 18 op-ed urging blind faith in Tony Blair's leadership, then when Blair invaded Iraq a few days later was shocked to see him make such a mistake, but then decided he better not say anything about the wisdom of the invasion until years later, but it's not very plausible. For all intents and purposes, Clinton's public statements on the Iraq issue (like those of Colin Powell and Tony Blair) were part of the push to round up "moderate" support for the war. I remember this stuff. I was one of the millions of Americans who thought that, sure, George W. Bush must be a maniac but if Bill and Hillary Clinton and Colin Powell and Madeleine Albright (and other Clinton-era officials like Ken Pollack) and Joe Biden and so on and so forth think it's a good idea, maybe I should have some more confidence. Obviously, that was a stupid, stupid mistake. But I find it really offensive that people who abused the trust of citizens who admired them by selling us on this mess now want to turn around and do it again by pretending that never happened.

My basic point of contention is that if France and Russia had done as Blair and Clinton wanted them to do -- really, if France had done as it had to do if it took its commitments to international law seriously -- then in all probability 'this mess' would not exist, either because Iraq would not be so messed up as it is now or because the mess that it would be would not be entirely ours, thereby making it decidedly not 'this mess'.

This is a frightening thing for me to say because I recognize that lurking at the heart of every mainstream Democrat is a conviction that Bush very nearly ruined international interventionism for a generation and only Hillary Clinton or maybe Obama can bring it back by proving that Democrats can do the freedom agenda right -- better experts, smarter officials, attitudes more conducive to conflict resolution, no crazy Jesus-based arrogance. And in judging Bill Clinton's paragraph above to be accurate, I am leaving the door wide open to the claim that Iraq could in fact have been done so much 'better' that it would not look like the colossal mistake and overreach that it does today. But I think any anti-war interlocutor has got to own up to this.

Coercive enforcement of 1441 was not ever a doomed enterprise from the get-go, no matter how deeply flawed was the Bush administration's execution of the patched-up substitute that the Coalition of the Willing was supposed to provide. Overreach was not inherent to the West's beating up on Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's insistence on breaking and flouting international rules. (The wisdom of institutionalizing such an approach in international law, that is, must be debated on terms other than effectiveness.) Overreach may well have been inherent in the US trying to do so all on its own, for a huge number of intersecting reasons. Interestingly, I am making the weird claim that an international occupation of Iraq, structurally speaking, would not have generated the onerous costs to the US that the US occupation of Iraq, structurally speaking, knowably did wind up generating.

PS Yglesias, like myself, is also annoyed at Hillary's shout out to Colin.
 

November 25, 2007

Yet Further Iraq Follies

Advisers to Senators Hillary [...] Clinton and Barack Obama say that the candidates have watched security conditions improve after the troop escalation in Iraq and concluded that it would be folly not to acknowledge those gains. At the same time, they are arguing that American casualties are still too high, that a quick withdrawal is the only way to end the war and that the so-called surge in additional troops has not paid off in political progress in Iraq. -- NYT

Wrong on all counts, but not the way our good hawks want. American casualties are still incredibly low. Part of this is because American injuries are very high; people who would have died are now living amputees. Even still, we should be proud of how few soldiers we have lost. If the war is worth fighting, the casualty numbers on our side do not change that. And if the war is not worth fighting, reducing the casualty numbers on our side wouldn't change that either. Casualties are a false lead.

Moving to the third point, the surge has paid off in political progress. Only a fool or a liar would ignore what's come over the Sunni tribes, would ignore the spate of cease-fires that almost certainly would not have happened without the surge. The problem is that the surge cannot cause the political progress necessary to eliminate the decisive role that an American presence in Iraq plays in keeping the country together. There is some progress, that progress remains inadequate, there is no guarantee that adequate progress will eventually result, and this war continues to cost us. I supported the surge because it made military sense in the short term, and here we are passing out of the short term, and the issue, as it has always been, remains bigger than and beside the point of the surge. I'm glad the surge has worked as well as it has. Maybe now we have a chance to get the strategy right.

And, moving to the second point, since the strategic choices are all not terribly exciting, I remain convinced that my ninja withdrawal strategy is the right one: stealthily, at times and places of our choosing, 'trickle down' our presence. It's a way to end the war that the Dems don't want to discuss and the GOP can't contemplate without shivering at the specter of defeat. Pity.

November 19, 2007

Feelings, Values, and Huckabee's Sense of Honor

Finally I can respond to Noah's very sharp and smartly reasoned post.

Noah thinks the charge of emotivism can be overused. He's right. He is also right that honor registers in the realm of feeling, that an opposite of honor is shame, and that shame is also felt. And he is right to imply strongly that it is right to feel the honor and shame that redound to one as a result of one's behavior.

But Noah rises to an unhelpfully high level of abstraction by casting my argument in terms of "banish[ing] feelings entirely as a source of value." I read that phrase aloud and I hear Max Weber lite. He did enough already to set us down the perilous road of separating facts from 'values.' I still do not know, unless I am walking through Wal-Mart, exactly what a value is. But I am not rude enough to stop the conversation there, and I think that specifically in Noah's terms he means the following:

I can appreciate the suspicion of feeling as a primary source of value (though neither am I convinced that that suspicion amounts to a knock-down argument against); I’m not at all ready to jettison feeling as a guide to judgement. And I don’t think Mr. Emotivism meant to do so either; quite the opposite.

I am more suspicious of talk of 'primary sources of value' than I am of feelings. Talk of 'feeling as a guide to judgment,' on the other hand, is something I can actually deliberate about without taking a walk through the set of What Dreams May Come, and I'm glad Noah cast it in those terms because I wholly agree that feeling must -- as in we have no choice -- factor into our deliberations, judgments, and actions. And I agree that MacIntyre agrees.

But here's the catch. Feelings can impel us toward and through deliberation, judgment, and action. But they can also shut down and steer us away from thinking, deciding, and doing certain things. Feelings can motivate, and supply us with the resources to achieve, a practice of self-conscious denial that can range from the very simple to the highly elaborate. Feelings can lead us to the conclusion that genocide is happening in Darfur but in the end it's okay that we're not doing anything about it. Maybe this is true -- maybe it withstands the test of fully reasoned thought -- but that doesn't at all mean that anyone who arrives at that conflicted conclusion by any means is equally correct in process or outcome. Feelings can lead us to privilege the way events or actions or nonactions make us feel over what they actually are.

And this leads me to closely and carefully challenge Noah's suggestion that honor cannot be possessed "in an objective sense." Strict as I am about 'sense' language I prefer to say that honor is objective. I know this sounds outrageous to a lot of people, so I will restrict myself for now to saying that it is objective in a very narrow fashion. I submit that it is objectively dishonorable to crawl around naked and sharing a pig trough with porcine companions. Of course on some flourishing alien planet there may be some highly significant waiver applicable to some ceremony where naked pig food eating is a trial of great honor. Indeed in an African culture I read about at some point this semester the coming of age ritual involves ritually receiving the abuse of the tribe. But we need to be nimble enough and honest enough to recognize, sociologically speaking, that when transgressions are permitted they do not necessarily cease to be transgressions. Nowhere is there a better case of the truth of this than war. Anywhere there is civilization murder is not honorable. Anywhere there are people murder generally and characteristically causes guilt and shame. But war waives some of the rules pertaining to murder.

The reason why I raise this prickly point is because what I really want to claim is that honor is objective only insofar as guilt has a minimal objectivity. We all recognize that people who feel no guilt are not wholly persons, that there is something radically defective about them. Surely many things can be crimes, and not all things that are crimes in one place at one time are crimes in others. We can be very historicist about the nature of crime and still admit that crime -- culpable wrongdoing -- is an objective thing however the contents might vary through history. Certain regularities emerge. But now I want to emphasize that shame and guilt are two different things. Someone might, for example, do the right thing in a way that causes them to appear to have done the wrong thing; that appearance brings great shame upon them while, at the same time, they (rightly) feel no guilt. There are complex variations on this theme. But if MacIntyre is right that all moral dilemmas can ultimately be resolved, even if at great cost and pain, then it is quite possible to encounter situations in which you will come out with zero guilt and some amount of shame. It is along these lines that I see objectivity in guilt as compared with the greater subjectivity of shame.

This is important because the honor/shame dichotomy that Noah sets up is not inaccurate but is also incomplete. Innocence/guilt overlays it. We recognize this in the idea of defending a woman's honor, for example. And if you accept this basic distinction, you can follow my line of thought to the possibility that -- just as someone can aptly feel shame but no guilt -- one can inaptly feel honor while guilty. In fact, by lifting the analysis to the abstract level of feelings as 'a source of value,' it becomes hard to recognize the importance of the distinction I am making: that we can use feelings of honor to prevent us from deliberating over whether or how we are guilty, passing a judgment in that regard, and then acting on it.

Now my worry over Huckabee comes into focus. I'm going to lay out some hypotheticals to explain. It may be the case, for instance, that staying in Iraq as a matter of strategic fact is not a good idea. Or it may be the case that staying in Iraq is not good as a matter of moral fact -- on the basis that most Iraqis want us to leave, or that we killed a lot of innocent Iraqis, or that we're wasting our national blood and treasure, or plenty of other theories. It isn't decisive to my analysis whether or not leaving in Iraq is the right thing to do strategically or morally or practically or whatever. But what is decisive is that by declaring the matter settled simply by deeming it dishonorable to leave -- with the only possible implication being that, 'in an objective sense', ending a war like Iraq on terms like those that would exist if we left is definitionally dishonorable -- it is precisely the process of judgment that is being disabled or severely crippled.

If we characterize feelings abstractly as 'sources of value', and judgment as something feelings can 'guide' us about, rather than guide us to, then we hamper our ability to recognize that the Huckabee argument, though possibly arriving at the right answer, does so in a dangerously vague and possibly mendacious way. Instead of sharing a deliberation about what honor is with regard to our presence and behavior in Iraq, arriving at a judgment, and acting it out, we foreclose deliberation, fail to make a true judgment, and continue our behavior without having to risk the pain of encountering dilemmas, contradictions, and crises created by any contradiction or guilt that we share. This would be a great misfortune. 

Specific to Iraq, there is another layer here. It may be dishonorable to remain in Iraq even if in the long run we end up helping a lot of Iraqis whose lives, at least collectively or nationally speaking, we upset severely. But the Huckabee argument makes posing this question impossible, unthinkable. Even if you want to completely subjectivize honor, this possibility remains. On the other hand, the guilt of remaining in Iraq may be greater than the guilt of leaving. But this possibility also has to go unconsidered. Why? How? By an appeal not to honor, which requires a plausible and eventually persuasive public account of what honor is, but to 'our sense of honor,' which is some kind of curious phantom that has all the trenchant meaninglessness of the safe punt into abstraction that characterizes 'values' talk. We don't have to explain to ourselves what 'our sense of honor' actually is, because it can magically both vary wildly in radical subjectivity and unite us all together. We can use feelings to avoid an entire, and entirely crucial, exercise of politics. Regardless of how you feel or think about the Iraq war, this is really a colossal and upsetting failure of America. If you can say one thing about the neocons it's that many of them have the courage to keep putting forward actual arguments about why their policies are good ones. Unfortunately their arguments are not as persuasive as one might hope. But we would all do ourselves a service to recognize that the passions can compel us to act as well as become resources for us to avoid thinking about, talking about, deciding about, and doing things about circumstances of ours that we'd rather not trouble ourselves about too deeply.

October 30, 2007

Consume Your Patriotism

Support the troops. Don't listen to them. Feels better that way.

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