by Will Wilson
This otherwise excellent article in the New Atlantis is seriously marred by the fact that it fails to address the strong empirical support for the modularity hypothesis in the form of double dissociations.
I get that the critique of neuroscience offered here is a sociological one which attacks the methodological failures and groupthink which (quite frankly) pervade the field of cognitive science; but I think attacks coming from a philosophy of mind angle are still the stronger ones on balance.
This otherwise excellent article in the New Atlantis is seriously marred by the fact that it fails to address the strong empirical support for the modularity hypothesis in the form of double dissociations.
I get that the critique of neuroscience offered here is a sociological one which attacks the methodological failures and groupthink which (quite frankly) pervade the field of cognitive science; but I think attacks coming from a philosophy of mind angle are still the stronger ones on balance.
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